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Abstract In 2010, Hölbl et al. showed that Shieh et al.’s mutual authentication and key agreement
scheme is vulnerable to the smart card lost attack, not achieving perfect forward secrecy, and proposed
a security enhanced scheme to eliminate these weaknesses. In this paper, we show that Hölbl et al.’s
security enhancement is still vulnerable to the smart card lost attacks. In addition, their scheme cannot
resist impersonation attacks and parallel session attacks. Seeing that the existing mutual authentication
schemes using smart cards are almost vulnerable to the smart card lost attacks, we further propose a new
one-time two-factor mutual authentication and key agreement scheme to eliminate these weaknesses.
© 2012 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
With the rapid development of all sorts of network,
more and more internet users are using various kinds of
wireless devices to carry out different kinds of transactions, or
obtaining many kinds of services provided by remote servers.
However, the user and the server should pass through the
mutual authentication in public networks before transactions.
Password authentication is one of the simplest andmostwidely
used strategies, because the user only needs to use the short
password. On the other hand, because the smart card has many
advantages in terms of cost, portability, capacity, efficiency and
cryptographic properties, it can also be used to design network
security protocols. Based on the merits of passwords and smart
cards (two-factor), many two-factor mutual authentication and
key agreement schemes have been proposed [1–5].
Generally speaking, two-factor authentication protocols
should consist of registration, login and verification phases. The
user and server share a secret, which is stored in the user smart
card, by combining it with the user password in the registration
phase. The user uses his password to extract the shared
secret from his smart card, and the shared secret is used to
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phases. However, since some secret information is stored in
the smart cart, adversaries are considered to have the ability
to get this information via logical or physical methods [6].
Thus, the adversary can use this information to mount off-line
password guessing attacks, and get the user password easily,
as the password is supposed to be easy-to-remember, and the
password space is small. Therefore, the major challenges in
designing two-factormutual authentication and key agreement
schemes are how to resist both off-line password guessing
attacks and smart card lost attacks.
Considering the existing one-time two-factor mutual au-
thentication schemes, many are insecure [7]. In 2002, Yeh
et al. [8] and Chien et al. [9] proposed a one-time two-
factor scheme, respectively. But Tsuji and Shimizu [10] and Ku
et al. [11] showed that Yeh et al.’s scheme was vulnerable to
stolen-verifier attacks, respectively. In 2005, Lee and Chen [12]
proposed an improved scheme to eliminate the weakness of
Yeh et al.’s scheme, but their scheme could not resist the smart
card lost attacks. In 2004, Ku and Chen [13] showed that Chien
et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to insider attacks. Hsu [14] and Lee
et al. [15] also showed that Chien et al.’s scheme is vulnerable
to parallel session attacks, and proposed improved schemes, re-
spectively. Juang [16] also proposed an improvement of Chien
et al.’s scheme. Later, Yoon et al. [17] and Yoon and Yoo [18]
demonstrated that Ku et al. and Lee et al.’s improved schemes
were still insecure. In 2007, Wang et al. [19] showed that both
Ku et al. scheme and Yoon et al. scheme [17] were still vul-
nerable to password guessing attacks, forgery attacks and de-
nial of service attacks, and proposed a further improvement
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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was vulnerable to impersonation attacks and smart card lost at-
tacks, which are not easily reparable and do not provide perfect
forward secrecy. In 2011, Chen et al. [21] showed that Wang
et al.’s improved scheme is vulnerable to the impersonation
attack and parallel session attack, and proposed an improve-
ment scheme. However, their improved scheme is still inse-
cure, e.g. vulnerable to the smart card lost attacks. Shieh and
Wang [22] pointed out theweakness of Juang’s scheme [16] and
proposed an improved scheme. In 2010, Hölbl et al. [23] showed
that Shieh et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the smart card lost at-
tack and does not achieve perfect forward secrecy. Further, they
proposed a security enhanced scheme. In 2009, Xu et al. [24]
proposed a new one-time authentication scheme with security
proof, but Song [25] showed that their scheme was vulnerable
to impersonation attacks, and proposed an improved scheme.
Unfortunately, Song’s scheme cannot resist the smart card lost
attack, and does not provide the perfect forward secrecy.
In this paper, we show that Hölbl et al.’s security enhance-
ment is still vulnerable to the smart card lost attack, and their
scheme cannot resist impersonation attacks and parallel ses-
sion attacks. Then, we further propose a new one-time two-
factor mutual authentication and key agreement scheme to
eliminate their weaknesses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review Hölbl et al.’s scheme. In Section 3, some attacks against
their scheme are described, and in Sections 4 and 5 we propose
a new scheme and analyze its security. After that, the security
and performance comparisons are presented in Section 6, and
we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Review of Hölbl et al.’s scheme
The notations used throughout this paper are summarized
as follows:
• p, q: two large prime numbers, such as q|p− 1;
• g: a generator with order q of the group GF(p);
• U: the user;
• ID: U ’s identity;
• PW : U ’s password;
• S: the server;
• (X, Y = gX mod p): S’s private–public key pair;
• h(): a secure cryptographic hash function;
• ∥: string concatenation operation;
• ⊕: bitwise XOR operation.
Hölbl et al.’s scheme consists of twophases: registration, and
login and key agreement phases.
2.1. Registration phase
U and S carry out the following steps during the user
registration phase.
Step 1: U chooses his identity ID, password PW and a random
number b, and computes h(b⊕ PW ). He submits his identity ID
and h(b⊕ PW ) to S through a secure channel.
Step 2: S computes R = h(ID ⊕ X) ⊕ h(b ⊕ PW ), and sends
a smart card to U via a secure channel, where the smart card
contains R and h().
Step 3: U enters b to the smart card.Figure 1: Hölbl et al.’s authentication scheme.
2.2. Login and key agreement phase
When U is about to logon to the remote server S,U
completes the following operations:
Step 1: U inserts his smart card into the card reader of a
terminal, and keys ID and PW .
Step 2: The smart card generates a random number, r , a large
random integer, c < p − 1, and computes d = R ⊕ h(b ⊕
PW ), C1 = d⊕ h(r ⊕ b), C2 = h(TU ⊕ h(r ⊕ b)), C3 = gc ⊕ d,
where TU is the current timestamp. Then, the smart card sends{ID, C1, C2, C3, TU } to S.
Upon receiving the message {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU }, S completes
the following operations:
Step 3: S checks if (TS − TU) ≤ ∆T , where TS is S’s current
timestamp and ∆T is the expected valid time interval for
transmission. If not, S rejects U ’s login request. Otherwise, S
computes d = h(ID⊕ X), C1′ = d⊕ C1, C2′ = h(TU ⊕ C1′), and
checks if C2′ = C2. If not, S rejects U ’s login request. Otherwise,
U is authenticated by S.
Step 4: S chooses a large random integer, s < p − 1, and
computes C4 = h(TU ⊕ TS ⊕ C1′), C5 = g s ⊕ d, the session
key, K = (C3 ⊕ d)s = gcs, and returns {C4, C5, TS, TU } to U .
After receiving the message, {C4, C5, TS, TU }, the smart card
checks the validities of TS and TU . If not, it is terminated.
Otherwise, the smart card computes C4′ = h(TU⊕TS⊕h(r⊕b)),
and compares it with the received C4. If they are equal, S is
authenticated by U . Then, the smart card computes the session
key, K = (C5 ⊕ d)c = gcs.
Thus, S and U share the session key, K , for subsequent
private communications. Figure 1 illustrates Hölbl et al.’s
authentication protocol.
3. Cryptanalysis of Hölbl et al.’s scheme
Hölbl et al. claimed that their scheme is robust and secure
against impersonation, parallel session and smart card lost
attacks. However, in this section, we show that Hölbl et al.’s
scheme does not provide these security requirements. The
details are as follows.
1858 Q. Xie / Scientia Iranica, Transactions D: Computer Science & Engineering and Electrical Engineering 19 (2012) 1856–18603.1. Parallel session attack
In Hölbl et al.’s scheme, when U and S perform the login and
key agreement phase, an adversary can get {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU }
and {C4, C5, TS, TU } from the public network. Then, the adver-
sary can impersonate the user, U , and send {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU }
to S as a new session where C1 = C1⊕ TU = d⊕ h(r ⊕ b)⊕ TU ,
C2 = C4 = h(TU ⊕ TS ⊕ h(r ⊕ b)), TU = TS .
After receiving {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU }, S can check the validity of
TU , and can compute:
C1′ = d⊕ C1 = d⊕ d⊕ h(r ⊕ b)⊕ TU = h(r ⊕ b)⊕ TU ,
C2′ = h(TU ⊕ C1′) = h(TS ⊕ h(r ⊕ b)⊕ TU).
Because C2′ = C2, the adversary can pass through the
authentication of S.
The reasonwhy Hölbl et al.’s scheme suffers from this attack
is that S uses bitwise XOR operations among h(r⊕ b), TS and TU
to compute C4 = h(TU ⊕ TS ⊕ h(r ⊕ b)). In order to overcome
this weakness, a possible countermeasure is that S replace C4
with C4 = h(TU ∥ TS ∥ h(r ⊕ b)).
3.2. Impersonation attack
In Hölbl et al.’s scheme, if an adversary gets {ID, C1, C2, C3,
TU } then, he can impersonate the user, U , to pass through the
authentication of S. The details are as follows:
The adversary computes T = TU ⊕ TU , C1 = C1 ⊕ T =
d⊕ h(r ⊕ b)⊕ T where TU is the current timestamp. Then, he
sends {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU } to S.
Upon receiving {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU }, S checks the validity of
TU , and computes:
d = h(ID⊕ X),
C1′ = d ⊕ C1 = d ⊕ d ⊕ h(r ⊕ b) ⊕ T = h(r ⊕ b) ⊕ T , C2′ =
h(TU⊕C1′) = h(TU⊕h(r⊕b)⊕T ) = h(TU⊕h(r⊕b)⊕TU⊕TU) =
h(h(r⊕b)⊕TU) and checkswhether C2 = h(TU⊕h(r⊕b)) = C2′
or not. Obviously, S may accept the adversary’s login request.
The reasonwhy Hölbl et al.’s scheme suffers from this attack
is that the smart card uses a bitwise XOR operation between
h(r ⊕ b) and TU to compute C2 = h(TU ⊕ h(r ⊕ b)). In order to
overcome this weakness, a possible countermeasure is for the
smart card to replace C2 with C2 = h(TU ∥ h(r ⊕ b)).
3.3. Smart card lost attack and off-line password guessing attack
If an adversary obtains R and b, which are stored in U ’s
smart card, where R = d ⊕ h(b ⊕ PW ), and gets U ’s login
message, {ID, C1, C2, C3, TU }, an adversary can launch the off-
line password guessing attack.
Because C1 = d ⊕ h(r ⊕ b) and C2 = h(TU ⊕ h(r ⊕ b)), an
adversary can compute d′ = R ⊕ h(b ⊕ PW ′), C1′ = C1 ⊕ d′,
and verify whether C2 = h(TU ⊕ C1′) holds or not, where PW ′
is a guessed password. If it holds, the guessed password is U ’s
password, otherwise the adversary tries another password, and
so on. Finally, the adversary can get the correct password, as the
password is short and human memorizable.
The reasonwhy Hölbl et al.’s scheme suffers from this attack
is that the user’s smart card contains R and b, and U ’s login
message includes the authenticator, C2, which only depends on
a password, thus the adversary can launch an off-line password
guessing attack. In order to overcome this weakness, a possible
countermeasure is that authenticator C2 should depend on both
the password and a random nonce.Figure 2: The proposed authentication scheme.
4. The proposed scheme
In this section, we will propose a new scheme with strong
security. The basic ideas of our constructions are as follows:
(1) In order to resist the smart card lost attack and off-line
password guessing attack, each authenticator in the login
and key agreement phase should depend on both the
password and a random nonce, and the Diffie–Hellman
value can be regarded as a random nonce.
(2) To resist parallel session and impersonation attacks, the
login and response messages should contain a string
concatenation operation.
The details of the proposed scheme are as follows.
4.1. Registration phase
U and S carry out the following steps during the user
registration phase.
Step 1: U chooses a password, PW , and his identity ID, then,
submits ID to S.
Step 2: S computes d = h(ID ⊕ X), and sends a smart card to
U via a secure channel, where the smart card contains ID, d and
h().
Step 3: U computes R = d⊕ h(PW ), and replaces dwith R. That
is, the smart card contains ID, h() and R = h(ID⊕ X)⊕ h(PW ).
4.2. Login and key agreement phase
When U is about to logon to the remote server, S,U
completes the following operations (Figure 2 illustrates our
protocol).
Step 1: U inserts his smart card into the card reader of a
terminal, and keys PW .
Step 2: The smart card generates a random number, c < p− 1,
and computes:
d = R⊕ h(PW ) = h(ID⊕ X), C0 = Y c mod p,
C1 = gc mod p, C2 = h(d ∥ C0 ∥ TU),
where TU is the current timestamp. Then, the smart card sends{ID, C1, C2, TU } to S.
Q. Xie / Scientia Iranica, Transactions D: Computer Science & Engineering and Electrical Engineering 19 (2012) 1856–1860 1859Upon receiving themessage, {ID, C1, C2, TU }, S completes the
following operations:
Step 3: S checks if (TS − TU) ≤ ∆T , where TS is S’s current
timestamp and ∆T is the expected valid time interval for
transmission. If not, S rejects U ’s login request. Otherwise, S
computes C2′ = h(h(ID⊕X) ∥ CX1 ∥ TU), and checks if C2′ = C2.
If not, S rejects U ’s login request. Otherwise, U is authenticated
by S.
Step 4: S chooses a large random integer, s < p − 1, computes
C3 = g s mod p, C1s, C4 = h(h(ID⊕ X) ∥ TS ∥ C1s ∥ TU), and the
session key, K = h(C1s), and returns {C3, C4, TS} to U .
After receiving the message, {C3, C4, TS}, the smart card
checks the validity of TS by TU ∗ − TS < ∆T , where TU ∗ is the
current time. If not, it is terminated. Otherwise, the smart card
computes C4′ = h(d ∥ TS ∥ C c3 ∥ TU), and compares it with the
received C4. If they are equal, S is authenticated by U . Then, the
smart card computes the session key, K = h(C3c).
Thus, S andUshare the session key,K , for subsequent private
communications.
5. Security analysis
In this section, we will show that the proposed scheme is
secure.
5.1. Offline password guessing attacks and smart card lost attacks
If an adversary can get all transmitted messages, {ID, C1, C2,
TU } and {C3, C4, TS}, between U and S, and R = h(ID ⊕ X) ⊕
h(PW ), which is stored in U ’s smart card, then, he launches an
off-line password guessing attack as follows:
The adversary may compute d′ = R⊕ h(PW ′)where PW ′ is
a trial password, but he cannot compute C2′ = h(d′ ∥ C0 ∥
TU)and cannot verify if C2′ = C2 holds or not, since he is
unable to compute the Diffie–Hellman value, C0 = Y c = gcX ,
from C1 and Y , due to the intractability of the Computational
Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem. The same reason why the
adversary is unable to compute C1s and cannot verify whether
his trial password, PW ′, is correct or not.
5.2. Forgery attack or impersonation attack
An adversary can get R = h(ID⊕X)⊕h(PW ), which is stored
in U ’s smart card, and launch forgery or impersonation attacks.
He chooses a random number, c < p− 1, and computes
d′ = R⊕ h(PW ′) = h(ID⊕ X), C0 = Y c mod p,
C1 = gc mod p, C2 = h(d′ ∥ C0 ∥ TU)
and sends {ID, C1, C2, TU } to S, where PW ′ is a trial password.
However, the adversary’s login messages cannot pass the
verification process of S due to d′ = R⊕ h(PW ′) ≠ h(ID⊕ X).
5.3. Parallel session attack
In the proposed scheme, an adversary wants to launch a
parallel session attack. However, it is infeasible, because two
authenticators, C2 = h(d ∥ C0 ∥ TU) and C4 = h(h(ID ⊕
X) ∥ TS ∥ C1s ∥ TU), contain different Diffie–Hellman values,
C0 = gcX and C1s = g sc . The adversary’s login request as a new
session run will not be accepted by S because his login request
cannot pass the verification process of S.
5.4. Perfect forward secrecy
In the improved scheme, the session key is K = h(g sc),
where c and s are nonces chosen by U and S, respectively. EvenTable 1: Security properties comparison.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
Wang et al. [19] x x x y y x y y
Chen et al. [21] y y x y x x x y
Hölbl et al. [23] x x x y y y y y
Xu et al. [24] y x y y y y y y
Song [25] y y x y y x y y
The proposed scheme y y y y y y y y
P1: parallel session attack;
P2: forgery attack or impersonation attack;
P3: smart card lost attack;
P4: password guessing attack;
P5: known-key attack;
P6: perfect forward secrecy;
P7: Denning–Sacco attack;
P8: replay attack;
y: scheme can resist such attack;
x: scheme cannot resist such attack.
if an adversary gets U ’s password, PW , and S’s secret key, X ,
he is not able to compute g sc , that is he is not able to compute
the session key of any previously established session, due to the
intractability of the CDH problem.
5.5. Replay attack
Suppose that an adversary impersonates U and replays U ’s
{ID, C1, C2, TU } to S, his login request will be rejected due to the
invalid timestamp, TU . If he revises TU to the valid TU ′, his login
request still cannot pass the verification process of S, since he
cannot generate the valid C2 corresponding to the new TU ′.
For the same reason, if an adversary impersonates S and
replays S’s {C3, C4, TS}, he still cannot succeed.
5.6. Denning–Sacco attack
Even if an adversary gets the session key, K = h(g sc), he
cannot get g sc due to the intractability under the assumption
of a one-way collision resistant cryptographic hash function.
Therefore, the adversary cannot getU ’s password, PW , S’s secret
key, X and d = h(ID⊕ X).
5.7. Known-key security
Even if an adversary gets U ’s password, PW , and S’s secret
key, X , he still cannot compute the session key due to the in-
tractability of the CDH problem. Due to the randomness and
independence of the generations of c and s in all sessions, the
session key, K = h(g sc), of each session is independent of that
of any other sessions. Therefore, an adversary is unable to com-
pute the previous and future session keys from one session key.
6. Security and performance comparisons
Security properties and performance cost comparisons
between our scheme and the other five related schemes in
[19,21,23–25] are given in Tables 1 and 2.
Let Te, Th, Td and Ta be the time for performing a modular
exponentiation, a one-way hash function, a symmetric encryp-
tion/decryption and an exclusive OR operation, respectively.
We ignore modular addition and string concatenation opera-
tions that are negligible compared to others. In the user reg-
istration of our scheme, it requires two hash and two exclusive
OR operations. In the login and key agreement phase, it requires
two hash, seven exclusive OR and six modular exponentiation
operations.
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Cost of login and key
agreement phase
Wang et al. [19] 10Ta + 8Th
Chen et al. [21] 8Ta + 8Th
Hölbl et al. [23] 17Ta + 7Th + 4Te
Xu et al. [24] 9Th + 6Te
Song [25] 3Ta + 8Th + 2Td + Te
The proposed scheme 2Ta + 7Th + 6Te
In performance comparison, we mainly focus on compu-
tations of the login and key agreement phase, since it is the
main body of an authentication scheme, and the registra-
tion phase only performs one time before authentication. Both
Wang et al.’s [19] and Chen et al.’s [21] schemes are more ef-
ficient, because they are completely based on hash and exclu-
sive OR operations, but do not provide perfect forward secrecy.
In order to achieve perfect forward secrecy, the designers al-
ways use the Diffie–Hellman key exchange technique to estab-
lish session keys. The proposed scheme needs a few additional
modular exponentiation operations compared to others, but is
more secure.
7. Conclusion
We have shown that Hölbl et al.’s security enhancement is
still vulnerable to the smart card lost attacks, and cannot resist
impersonation and parallel session attacks. To eliminate these
weaknesses, we propose a secure one-time two-factor mutual
authentication and key agreement scheme, which keeps the
merits of Hölbl et al.’s scheme.
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